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Abstract 
This article provides a critical analysis of the scope and the internal dynamics of the EU-27 Single 
European Market (SEM) policy framework, which is characterised by the intrinsic tension between 
application of a hard deregulatory strategy in the area of market liberalisation and the soft 
approach of the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC).  The latter acknowledges the diversity of 
national socio-economic models and reluctance of member states to transfer key areas of economic 
and social policy-making to the EU level. It instead concentrates on promoting best practice on the 
basis of policy exchange and learning and the overall framework targets set out in the Lisbon 
Strategy. The lack of commitment amongst member states towards applying the OMC and the 
Lisbon targets as a basis for national policy development illustrates that the Commission has yet to 
achieve a consensus amongst the EU-27 member states on common economic and social policy 
priorities. In the wake of the global economic crisis the SEM policy agenda therefore risks being 
reduced to a market liberalisation programme with waning levels of support from citizens and 
national administrations. 
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ECONOMIC INTEGRATION HAS ALWAYS BEEN AT THE HEART OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT. 
However, in recent years the European Union (EU) has increasingly concentrated on the 
deepening of the Single European Market (SEM) due to the difficulties in reaching 
agreement amongst member states in the area of political integration.  The SEM is now 
presented as the centrepiece of the EU integration process and is actively promoted by 
the European Commission. The increasing liberalisation drive which the Commission has 
adopted since the creation of the Common Market in the Treaty of Rome in 1957, 
particularly on the way towards the Single Market in the aftermath of the Single European 
Act in 1987, has repeatedly clashed with national resistance on the part of the member 
states.  The tendency of member state governments to try to defend the competitive 
economic advantage of their domestic economies against Commission attempts to create 
a level playing field for trade and economic competition has been a constant feature of 
the Single Market. The Commission tried to solve this dilemma by developing a 
distinguished dual strategy, in which it combines the acceleration of market liberalisation 
with the acknowledgement of national competences in the area of social policies. This 
approach was represented in the original Lisbon Agenda which the EU adopted in March 
2000 in response to the lack of progress in the completion of key areas of Single Market 
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integration and noticeable weaknesses in the economic performance of individual 
member states.  Lisbon was hence aimed at turning the EU into the “most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based based economy” by boosting economic growth through 
quicker market liberalisation and a focus on national job creation on the basis of setting 
overall employment targets (European Council 2000). 
 
Due to the lack of progress on the part of the member states in pursuing these targets, the 
newly appointed Barroso Commission relaunched Lisbon in 2005 as a strategy on the basis 
of the recommendations made in the report issued by the High Level Group under former 
Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok. The Kok report called on the EU Commission to 
concentrate on accelerating economic growth and job creation in the member states by 
monitoring their performance more rigidly. It also recommended the acceleration of the 
removal of national barriers towards market liberalisation in order to enhance competition 
and business activity (European Commission, 2004a: 17 and 24). The Commission 
subsequently intensified the monitoring of individual member state performances, both in 
the area of Single Market legislation and in the pursuit of the Lisbon goals. In the former 
area the Commission has strengthened its “hard” approach of implementing Community 
legislation and removing national legislative barriers on the basis of compulsory EU 
directives. Here the Commission has implemented a tight monitoring regime on the basis 
of scoreboards and a “naming and shaming” strategy, which ultimately results in 
penalising attempts of member states to delay or water down Single Market legislation. In 
‘soft’ policy areas which affect the domestic welfare state tradition of member states, like 
employment and education, the Commission is avoiding attempts to force member states 
into a one-size-fits all approach of forced harmonisation. Instead, it has adopted the rather 
loose “open method of coordination”, which encourages member states to develop their 
own domestic policy solutions by adopting elements of best practice from other member 
states through information exchange and policy learning (Büchs 2008: 25).  
 
This article examines the internal mechanisms of the Single Market and argues that the 
ongoing revision of the Commission’s Single Market legislative framework reflects an 
inherent dilemma in the process of economic integration. While member states have, in 
principle, signed up to the ethos of free market competition in the SEM, in practice, they 
continue to defend national economic monopolies and remain hostile towards attempts 
to harmonise social policy standards across the EU. This dilemma of trying to achieve 
consensus amongst an increasing variety of socio-economic models in the enlarged Single 
Market of 27 member states forces the Commission to pursue a rather complex and 
contradictory policy framework. The Single Market is thus dominated by a strategy of 
“negative” integration, where the Commission has successfully established its position as 
an enforcer of pro-competition framework legislation which ultimately removes national 
regulatory barriers. This increasingly affects core elements of domestic economic models, 
particularly in the crucial area of services, where national opposition against removing 
former public service monopolies remains substantial. While the Commission’s role in 
developing SEM framework legislation and monitoring its implementation on the micro-
level of national governance has grown substantially in recent years, it has not managed to 
weaken the role of the member states in safeguarding their veto power over the macro-
level of strategic economic and social policy-making. The adoption of the OMC in the latter 
area therefore represents an approach which tries to achieve a workable compromise 
between the ambition to achieve at least a basic level of policy convergence between 
member states, who have shown little enthusiasm to pool their national sovereignty in this 
area (Wallace, 2005: 487). This consensual approach restricts the role of the Commission in 
the field of economic and social policy to the determination of the overall Lisbon targets in 
cooperation with the member states in the Council. The targets are aimed at promoting 
job creation through welfare reform and investment in research and education. Member 
states are subsequently encouraged to pursue these targets in their national policy 
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strategies. This policy mode has been described as a “two-level game” (Büchs 2007: 19). It 
adopts a variation of the concept originally put forward by Putnam (1988) and 
subsequently adopted by Moravcsik (1993) for his liberal intergovernmentalist analysis of 
the European integration process. Moravcsik argued that member state governments 
attempt to influence the policy agenda on the supranational EU level on the basis of a set 
national preferences which previously emerged on the domestic level in a process of 
liberal preference formation. With regard to the OMC, member state governments are thus 
pursuing a twofold strategy, in which, in the first instance, they attempt to influence the 
Commission in developing the OMC policy agenda by “uploading” their national priorities 
(Büchs, 2007: 26). In the second instance, member states tend to introduce those OMC 
policy recommendations which correspond with their domestic policy agenda and to 
ignore or water down those that do not (Meyer et al. 2007: 213). This leads to a 
“commitment-implementation” gap between the EU and the national level. It explains why 
the Commission has to repeatedly point the finger at the lack of collective member state 
commitment towards the OMC policy agenda under Lisbon. As the OMC is a clear 
departure from the classic integration method of gradually transferring national 
sovereignty to the EU level, it accepts differences in the domestic institutional constraints 
and national preferences amongst member states rather than trying to harmonise them 
(Borrás and Jacobsson 2004a: 202). The practice of “benchmarking” best performance and 
trying to encourage member states to achieve policy consensus on the basis of 
information exchange and learning is frequently hampered by the prevailing differences 
in the national institutional cultures in the economic, social and legal sphere (Arrowsmith 
et al. 2004: 323). The “soft” coordinative approach has thus failed to lead even to a gradual 
emergence of a common economic and social policy agenda in the Single Market which 
goes beyond pure market liberalisation (Meyer and Umbach, 2007: 115).  As a result the 
SEM policy agenda is increasingly facing the risk to be perceived as a rather narrow 
deregulatory framework, which attempts to undermine existing pillars of national 
economic and welfare state traditions. This has lead the Commission to undertake a review 
of the Single Market policy agenda in 2007, in which it included reflections from national 
and supranational stakeholders and also from citizens across the EU (European 
Commission 2006a). The global economic crisis, following the credit crunch in the United 
States, has caused member states to push the Commission to focus more on the 
development of policy solutions beyond the core ‘hard’ deregulatory framework of the 
internal market mechanisms. 
 
 
Jobs and growth centre stage: A critical assessment of the 2005 revised Lisbon 
Strategy 
 
The original Lisbon Agenda, passed at the Lisbon European Council in 2000, had emerged 
on the basis of the realisation amongst member states that a consensus on further steps 
towards policy harmonisation in the social area, particularly employment, could not be 
reached. At the major intergovernmental conference in Amsterdam in 1997 the newly 
elected government of French prime minister Jospin had promoted the harmonisation of 
European employment policies but met the opposition of the German and the British 
governments, who preferred to strengthen coordination in this area. Jospin threatened to 
veto the treaty if it did not contain a commitment to joint efforts on the employment front 
(Umbach 2009: 182). This lead to the inclusion of an employment title in the Amsterdam 
Treaty and the  development of a European employment strategy, based on the principle  
that the future of the social policy in the Single Market should develop on the basis of a 
loose intergovernmental coordination of best practices. This gave birth to the open 
method of co-ordination approach of Lisbon, under which member states are expected to 
follow overall targets developed by the Commission, while the individual implementation 
in the domestic context remains in the hands of their national administrations. The lack of 
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willingness to agree to the pooling of national economic and social policies, in spite of the 
common global economic challenges which all member states are confronted with, shows 
that the national level remains the main point of reference for policy development in the 
EU for both citizens and policy-makers. Member states therefore continue to be adamant 
to defend their “comparative institutional advantage”, on the basis of the national 
institutional framework surrounding their economies. This leads to a variety of levels of 
economic success of individual countries in different contexts and at different points in 
time, most prominently outlined in the “varieties of capitalism” approach (Hall and Soskice 
2001: 37). The absence of binding positive harmonisation of EU-wide labour market 
regulations and welfare standards contrasts unfavourably with the predominance of 
negative integration in the area of market liberalisation (Scharpf 1999). In contrast to the 
assumptions of neofunctionalists in the early days of the integration process that the 
Community would enter into a quasi-automatic spillover drive towards ever deeper 
economic, political and social integration (Haas 1968), the EU has witnessed a rather 
limited pooling of economic sovereignty in the Single Market area. This results from the 
fact that the aftermath of the Treaty of Rome was characterised by the failure of member 
states to substantiate the aim of accompanying the establishement of an integrated 
market with the harmonisation of national economic and social policies. In particular the 
disagreement over the extent of social integration was also one of the main reasons why 
the integration process as a whole slowed down considerably in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Leibfried 2005: 246). The issue of social integration was subsequently mainly considered 
to be “in a supporting role” for the hard economic considerations targeted at deepening 
market integration (Hantrais 2007: p. 21). The fundamental changes to the Community’s 
acquis communautaire following the Treaty of Rome were characterised by the priority of 
accelerating the completing of the Common Market on the basis of a renewed impetus 
towards the deregulation of domestic legislative restrictions. In the mid-1980s the three 
largest member states the UK, France and Germany showed a clear correspondence in 
their interests to achieve rapid economic liberalisation in the European Community as a 
means to counter rising unemployment in their domestic economies (Moravcsik 1991: 51). 
The policy framework designed under the Single European Act consequently limited the 
Community’s ambition in the area of social policy to the expansion of qualified majority 
voting in areas concerning the Common Market, with an intention to expand 
supranational powers on social issues in the future (European Community 1987). The SEA 
set the background for the most fundamental step in the integration process since Rome, 
the Treaty of Maastricht signed in 1992. Even Maastricht was nevertheless disappointing 
with regard to its achievement on the social front. The fact that the Social Protocol, which 
mainly gave the EU soft coordinating powers in promoting social protection and 
improved living and working conditions, was put in the annex of the treaty on the 
insistence of the British government, showed that this continued to remain a low priority 
area for member states. The Delors Commission was therefore forced to abandon any 
attempts to harmonise social policies and focused on the coordination of national policies 
through cooperation and policy exchange instead (Leibfried 2005: 249; Hantrais 2007: 30-
31). 
 
Those who had hoped that the tyding-up exercise at the Amsterdam IGC in 1997 would 
lead to a correction of the imbalance between market integration and the lack of social 
integration were bitterly disappointed. French initiatives to strengthen the harmonisation 
of employment policies in the EU were rejected by the British and German governments, 
and the compromise that was reached concentrated on loose policy co-ordination in the 
form of an EU employment committee. The purpose of the employment committee to 
encourage member states to adopt a method of mutual policy-learning on labour market 
reform and welfare reform (European Union 1997: article 137, paragraph 2) set the way for 
the best-practice benchmarking approach of the open method of coordination which was 
subsequently applied for the European employment strategy. 
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Maastricht had intensified the efforts towards the deepening of economic and monetary 
integration, with the decision to achieve Economic and Monetary Union by 1999 and the 
goal to develop a fully integrated Single European Market. The desire of member states to 
rapidly move towards the completion of Single Market integration was subsequently put 
into concrete form in the Internal Market Strategy of 1999. The basis for the IMS is a hard 
liberalisation strategy of national economies, based on directives which member states 
need to implement correctly and within an allocated timeframe if they want to avoid 
infringement cases against them at the European Court of Justice. Apart from the risk to be 
“named and shamed” in the regular implementation reports published by the 
Commission, member states hence face substantial financial penalties if they delay the 
opening of certain sectors of their domestic market to full internal and external 
competition. 
 
As a result of the persistently high unemployment figures in many European countries 
throughout the 1990s, when the EU-15 average total unemployment rate fluctuated 
between seven and 10 per cent compared with less than five per cent in the United States 
(Figure 1), the EU decided to combine the process of market liberalisation under the IMS 
with the policy framework passed at the March 2000 Lisbon summit.  
 
 
Figure 1: Average unemployment rate EU-15 and  US (%) 
 
 
Source: EUROSTAT (2009) 
 
The Lisbon process follows a logic which is build on the premise that rapid market 
liberalisation and enhanced open competition will ensure persistently high GDP growth 
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and employment rates across the Single Market. Lisbon promotes a social model for the 
SEM, which considers employment to be a precondition for the achievement of social 
cohesion in the societies of the member states (European Council 2000). The problem of 
this approach lies in the combination of a “hard” Single Market liberalisation programme, 
which is accompanied by a “soft” best practice benchmarking procedure in the area of 
employment policies, welfare state reform and also education and training. The Lisbon 
goal of creating a “knowledge economy”, which is supposed to enable Europe to compete 
successfully with the rising economic powers in Asia (particularly China and India) in an 
increasingly fierce global economic environment, has been left under the mechanism of 
the open method of coordination. Member states are encouraged to exchange good 
practice in education and training based on the overall targets set by the Commission. 
One of its more prominent features is the “Bologna” process, which is aimed at gradually 
converging higher education qualifications between member states and to create a 
“European Higher Education Area (EHEA)” (European Union 1999).  
 
The target-driven approach of the OMC grants member states a relatively large amount of 
flexibility with regard to the development of their domestic policies. As outlined at the 
beginning of this article, the lack of binding policy harmonisation in this area and the 
emphasis on policy development and implementation on the domestic level leads to a 
generally slow process of policy coordination with rather fragmented outcomes. At the 
same time, the various target-driven strategies under the OMC are often excessively 
ambitious in their timeframe and scope. Member state governments consequently rarely 
consider them as a framework for their national policy agenda. The relatively weak threat 
of being “named and shamed” in the case of non-compliance in one of the various 
progress reports which are issued by the Commission on a regular basis, is thus no 
substitute for compulsory common standards (particularly in the areas of job quality and 
welfare provision) as long as the internal dynamics of the SEM remain characterised by “a 
lack of ‘ownership’ of the Lisbon strategy by politicians, whose political support is mainly 
determined by their actions at national level” (Dierx and Ilzkovitz 2006: 41). 
 
It is important to note in this respect that the EU applies the OMC in a number of different 
ways depending on the policy area. This ranges from the very clearly defined stability and 
growth criteria for the members of the eurozone to softer approaches towards the co-
ordination of employment, welfare and education standards (Borrás and Jacobsson 2004: 
192). It is frequently argued that due to the diversity of  socio-economic models in Europe, 
the OMC offers the freedom for member states to pick and choose which measures they 
consider to be suitable for their own domestic reform strategies and “therefore make 
political action more practicable” (Borrás and Greve 2004: 333). Although the OMC gives 
member states a large amount of flexibility, it has yet to prove that it is a mechanism which 
is efficient in embedding market liberalisation with noticeable socially cohesive effects 
across the different societies of the currently 27 member states. The process of best 
practice benchmarking too frequently remains at the level of a display of vanity between 
member states with regard to best performance, which then leads to “an obsession with 
placings in ‘league tables” to the detriment of the quality of outcomes” (Arrowsmith, 
Sisson and Marginson 2004: 321).  
 
This explains why the EU considered it to be necessary to relaunch the whole Lisbon 
project in 2005. The lack of member state progress on achieving the Lisbon targets, 
particularly in the area of job creation (70 per cent employment rate by 2010 and 60 per 
cent for women) was highlighted in the 2004 Kok report, which provided an assessment of 
the efficiency of the Lisbon Strategy. The report warned member states that it was mainly 
due to their lack of “determined political action” that the targets of the original 2000 
Lisbon Agenda had not been sufficiently met. The report yet also criticised Lisbon’s 
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“overloaded agenda” and “conflicting priorities”, which would make it harder to find 
support and consensus amongst member states (European Commission 2004a: 6). 
 
This set the tone for the relaunch of Lisbon under the newly appointed Barroso 
Commission in 2005. The relaunch of Lisbon was based on the criticism made in the Kok 
report of an overburdened list of policy objectives in the 2000 Council agenda. The new 
strategy intended to set this right by concentrating on the priorities of “growth and jobs 
centre stage”. It was noticeable that the revised strategy adopted a far less balanced tone 
than the original agenda and clearly referred to a neo-liberal economic viewpoint. This 
could be seen in its emphasis on the need to develop the Single Market into a “knowledge 
economy” where the everyone would have to take on greater individual responsibilities by 
accepting the need for lifelong education and training to be able to “climb up the 
productivity ladder and guarantee that overall our productivity grows quickly” (European 
Commission 2005: 13). 
 
The neo-liberal trend of the Lisbon relaunch could be seen in the prioritisation of market 
liberalisation and the deregulation of national practices, particularly in the three areas of 
services, corporate governance and financial markets. The 2005 document underlines 
even more clearly that market liberalisation and unlimited competition must be the top 
priority for the EU in its pursuit of the Lisbon goals: 
 
Competition is of fundamental importance for the whole partnership for growth and 
jobs (...) Cutting unnecessary costs, removing obstacles to adaptability and innovation 
and more competition and employment friendly legislation will help create more 
conductive conditions for economic growth and improved productivity. (European 
Commission 2005: 19) 
  
In the area of corporate governance, the new emphasis on deregulation was most obvious 
in the recommendations of the 2002 Winter Group report, which substantially influenced 
the direction of the EU corporate governance liberalisation strategy. The report proposed 
to drastically reduce the regulatory burden for businesses within the Single European 
Market modelled along the lines of US corporate governance. The report argued that the 
existing low-level regulatory environment in the US had shown that a laisser-faire and self-
regulatory approach towards business operations across member state boundaries would 
be the best mechanism for a dynamic corporate environment. The Winter Group 
consequently proposed to implement the principle of the freedom of movement for 
companies and businesses across the SEM, with a minimum of interference from national 
or supranational regulations on the internal structure and the operation of companies 
(European Commission 2002). In the area of capital and financial markets, the 
Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan adopted the principles set out in the 2000 
Lamfalussy report on the regulation of European Security Markets, which recommended 
steps towards the elimination of “administrative, regulatory or other types of obstacles 
which in practice impede cross-border securities transactions” (European Commission 
2000: 5). 
 
The most controversial area of market integration in terms of its impact on national 
economic and social models is the integration of the services sector. Here the Commission 
had originally initiated a rather radical approach. The widely debated draft services 
directive that was developed under the leadership of the former Single Market 
Commissioner Fritz Bolkestein in 2004, intended to substantially weaken the control of 
member state authorities over the operation of foreign service providers in their country. 
The inherent “country of origin” principle of the draft directive intended to allow the 
operation of services in any member state on the basis of the legal background of the 
service provider’s country of origin and the supervision by the national authorities in the 
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country of origin (European Commission 2004b: 9). The directive was widely considered as 
a legal framework that would undermine national service quality standards and the 
protection of individual consumer rights for the sake of a swift removal of all restrictions to 
the free movement of services. The general definition of a service as an “economic activity” 
and of public services as “services of general interests” (European Commission 2004b: 14) 
reflected an approach which fundamentally contradicted the traditional public service 
ethos of many member states. This was reflected in the level of opposition that emerged 
from the European Parliament and  national governments, particularly France and 
Germany, whose leaders Schröder and Chirac warned that that the directive would “terrify” 
the people of Europe.  
 
The compromise directive which emerged from these discussions was subsequently 
adopted by the Council and the European Parliament in December 2006, and should now 
gradually be implemented in the member states until the end of 2009. It was substantially 
toned down in terms of its scope and controversial content. Public services as “services of 
general interest” are generally excluded from the directive (Paragraph 17, preamble, 
Directive 2006/123/EC), and also the directive specifically does not apply to a number of 
services which are classified as “services of general economic interest”, such as transport, 
postal services, healthcare, and also social services, such as housing and childcare 
(Paragraph 21-27, preamble, Directive 2006/123/EC). The directive also gives member 
states the right to initiate legislation which protects “the public interest, in particular in 
relation to social policy objectives” (Paragraph 71, preamble, Directive 2006/123/EC). This 
provision has proven to be a relatively powerful tool in the hands of member states which 
allows them to slow down and obstruct the liberalisation of individual service sectors. As 
Badinger and Maydell’s study of the legal and economic impact of the services directive 
highlights,  “member states keep a high degree of obstructive legislation, both in 
quantitative as well as qualitative terms, and tend to abuse their margin of discretion” 
(Badinger and Maydell 2009: 703). In this respect the study highlights that the European 
Court of Justice has been quite liberal in accepting member state justifications for 
overriding the general rule of non-discrimination against foreign service providers on the 
basis of the protection of public interests (Badinger and Maydell 2009: 699). 
 
While the 2006 watered-down services directive  seems to have found a compromise 
between a deregulatory liberalisation approach and the need to protect consumers 
(Barnard 2008: 323), it has nevertheless become clear that the Commission considers to 
work towards the removal of current restrictions to the full liberalisation of the services in 
the Single Market. The Commission continues to pursue the goal of integrating those 
service areas which are currently still exempt at a later stage. The recent high-level 
conference on the future of services in the Single Market, organised by the Commission 
and the Czech Council presidency, highlighted the need for member states to consider 
“the possibility of applying innovative tools (...) to sectors or aspects not covered by the 
Services Directive” (European Council 2009b: 4). The Commission drive towards full 
competition in the area of services is problematic because it affects the core of national 
social models in member states. The concept of public space is an integral part of European 
societies, and is embedded to a greater or lesser extent in all national economies, most 
noticeably in continental Europe and Scandinavia. Here the concept of an active state as a 
provider of high quality public services which are accessible to all citizens is based on the 
principle that “all citizens should have an equal right to participate in economic and social 
life” (Hutton 2002: 63). This is connected with the notion of the state as a protector against 
market forces by granting citizens essential social rights, such as good standards in the 
provision of healthcare, education and welfare. If the Commission continues to push 
towards the inclusion of the core public services which are currently excluded from the 
services directive, it risks provoking growing hostility towards the Single Market policy 
framework in many member states. This would occur against a background where  
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national governments are already slowing down the compulsory implementation of Single 
Market directives, particularly in the area of services, where the Commission had to 
introduce 18 per cent of all infringement proceedings in 2009 (European Commission 
2009a: 21). It remains to be seen if the application of a “single regulatory model” can be 
effectively applied to the diversity of services that exist within the varieties of economies 
and social systems in the EU-27 (Badinger and Maydell 2009: 710). 
 
The combination of the pro-competition and privatisation drive in the Internal Market 
Strategy with the loose coordinative framework of the OMC in the area of employment, 
welfare and education poses a long-term strategic dilemma in terms of efficiency and level 
of support in the member states. As Figure 2 shows, the European employment strategy 
did not manage to initiate a substantial boost to the average employment rate in the 
enlarged EU-27. Before the current global economic crisis, the average EU-27 employment 
rate rose from 63 to 66 per cent between 2004 and 2008 and still remains under the Lisbon 
target of 70 per cent. In contrast, the United States exceeded this permanently before the 
downturn of 2007/08. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Total Employment Rate EU-27 and US (%) 

 
Source: EUROSTAT (2009) 
 
 
The latest Joint Employment Report for 2008/09 illustrates that the global economic crisis 
has made it even harder for most member states to meet the 70 per cent target. The 
diverse levels of success on the job front amongst individual member states is shown in 
Figure 3, which reflects national employment and unemployment rates in the EU-27 in 
2007. It shows that only a small number of member states (the UK, Austria, Cyprus, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark and Finland) managed to reach or exceed the Lisbon 
target.  
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Figure 3: Employment vs. Unemployment rates in the EU-27 
 
Source: European Council (2009) 
 
 
This is significant because the employment figures for 2009/10 are likely to be substantially 
worse and they will occur on the basis of ongoing structural unemployment problems 
amongst young people and the lack of access to lifelong education and training 
opportunities in many member states (European Council 2009b: 6). The success of the 
OMC to coordinate national policy responses to the common challenge of unemployment 
therefore remains limited. This is acknowledged in the report and underlined by calls for 
the swift adoption of a new “flexicurity” approach in national employment and welfare 
state policies to counter the effects of the instability in the global economy.  The concept 
of “flexicurity” is modelled along the lines of the “third way” welfare-to-work strategies 
which emerged in the late 1990s in the US under President Bill Clinton and the UK under 
New Labour. The European Commission defined it as a combination between ‘flexibility 
and security on the labour market’ in its 2006 report ‘Employment in Europe’, with a 
particular focus on the flexible employment contracts, active labour market policies and 
the reform of education, training and welfare policies (European Commission 2006b). 
Modelled along the lines the Danish employment model it is aimed at reintegrating 
people into the labour market who have previously been registered as long-term 
unemployed through welfare activation strategies and investment in education and 
training: 
 
The current economic context reinforces the need for efficient and effective, but 
especially integrated, flexicurity approaches in all Member States (...) Active inclusion 
policies and activation policies including labour market training will become more 
essential to avoid the long-term and persistent unemployment that may otherwise 
follow. (European Council 2009b: 3) 
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Under the harsh economic conditions of the global credit crunch, the combination of the 
deregulatory drive of the Single Market legislation and the promotion of employment as 
the ultimate strategy against poverty and social exclusion under Lisbon risks losing the 
support of the citizens in the member states, who seem to view the EU policy agenda as an 
destructive rather than protective intrusion into the national economic and social policy 
domain. The view of growing sections of the European public of the EU as a force that “has 
sufficient political muscle to destabilize existing national systems without the strength, in 
the employment sphere at least, to build alternative EU-wide systems of regulation” 
(Arrowsmith et al 2004: 6) played a major role in the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty (the 
former Constitutional Treaty) in public referenda in formerly pro-integrationist countries 
like France, the Netherlands in 2005 and the Republic of Ireland in 2008. The Irish also 
initially rejected the Nice Treaty in 2001, but this was mainly due to justified concerns that 
the impending enlargement towards new member states in Central and Eastern Europe 
would marginalise smaller EU-15 member states and cut them off from existing structural 
funds (Daily Telegraph 2001). The EU is hence confronted with a new debate on the need 
to enhance the drive towards economic competition and high levels of employment with 
a more coherent common social agenda which includes wider set of EU-wide legislative 
standards for workers in an increasingly integrated borderless labour market in the SEM. 
The increasing numbers of working poor in the SEM justify doubts about the 
Commission’s assumption that high levels of employment will quasi-automatically result in 
high levels of social cohesion in European societies. The latest Eurostat figures (Figure 4) 
on the levels of people who are in work but are classified to be at risk of falling into 
poverty because they receive less than 60 per cent of the median income show that in 
2007 only seven member states (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and the Netherlands) had less than five per cent of people who fell into this 
category. The rest of the EU-27 countries had more than five per cent of their population in 
work, but at risk of falling into poverty, with seven member states showing levels above 
eight (Italy, Portugal, Latvia) or even 10 per cent (Spain, Greece, Romania, Poland). 

 
Figure 4: In work-at-risk-of-poverty rate (%)

Source: EUROSTAT (2009) 
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The Single Market Review: A new direction for the SEM after the credit crunch? 
 
The Commission responded to the controversy on the services directive and the growing 
unease about the direction of the Single Market in the member states by initiating a 
review of the policy framework in 2006. The review was based on the acknowledgement of 
concerns regarding “the social and environmental implications of market opening” 
(European Commission 2007a: 3). The review took place in the context of a public 
consultation which consisted of survey of the opinions of citizens, stakeholders and 
interest groups, particularly trade unions. Especially the latter had in previous years 
criticised the Commission for tailoring Single Market policies too much towards business 
interests, at the expense of ordinary citizens (European Commission, 2006: 10). In the wake 
of the review, the Commission has tried to move away from the narrow focus on growth 
and jobs and highlighted the need to encompass the Single Market into a “renewed social 
agenda for the 21st century”, which takes into account the pressures on individuals as a 
result of the global economic crisis. Although the policy solutions and mechanisms the 
Commission proposes as part of the new social agenda are strongly based on Lisbon 
(“flexicurity” and OMC), a stronger focus on a formerly neglected aspects of the Single 
Market are noticeable. The 2008 Social Agenda explicitly takes up the concern of many 
trade unions that work on its own is, in many cases, not a sufficient means to lift people 
out of poverty: 
 
Even employment is not a guarantee against poverty: in-work poverty is on the 
increase with some eight per cent of employed people at risk of poverty. There are 
barriers and financial disincentives preventing or discouraging certain groups from 
gaining full access to employment, training, education, housing and health-care. 
(European Commission 2008a: 12) 
 
The Commission has also started to address the issue of the quality of employment and 
work-life-balance more explicitly (European Commission 2008b), in response to the 
realisation that “citizens and stakeholders expect the EU to bring added value to social 
development” (European Commission 2008b: 15). It nevertheless remains hesitant to 
adopt a binding legislative approach in these areas and emphasises the continuing focus 
on the OMC which it claims has “helped Member States to develop a shared vision of 
social challenges” (European Commission 2008b: 16). The Commission yet plans to adopt a 
more streamlined “partnership approach” in this area, which focuses on “establishing and 
maintaining closer cooperation within and between the Member States, and with the 
Commission, in all areas that are relevant for the single market” (European Commission, 
2009b: 3). 
 
Under this approach, the Commission continues to respect the responsibility of the 
member states for the implementation of Single Market directives and OMC targets at the 
domestic level. At the same time, it intends to liaise more closely with national 
administrations in order to ensure that all member states work towards the effective 
implementation of Single Market goals (European Commission, 2009b: 3). As part of this, 
the Commission has recently become more active in proposing framework legislation in 
the employment area. It has proposed the establishment of a “European Works Council”, 
which is aimed at “ensuring the effectiveness of employees’ transnational information and 
consultation rights” and  “increasing the proportion of European Works Councils” 
(European Parliament and Council 2009, preamble, paragraph 7) to ensure the 
improvement of job quality across the Single Market. The directive, which has now been 
adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, takes into account that in the 
increasingly integrated Single European Market “procedures for informing and consulting 
employees as embodied in legislation or practice in the Member States are often not 
geared to the transnational structure of the entity which takes the decisions affecting 
those employees” (European Parliament and Council 2009, preamble, paragraph 11). The 
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directive consequently determines that companies which operate in two or more member 
states, with at least 1,000 employees in total and at least 150 employees in each member 
state (Article 2, paragraph 1a and 1c), need to set up European Work Councils or at least 
“create other suitable procedures for the transnational information and consultation of 
employees” (preamble, paragraph 14).  However, the directive also emphasises that the 
responsibilities of a European Work Council  will be strictly limited to “transnational” issues 
(Article 1, paragraph 3) and is supposed to promote a “dialogue and exchange of views 
between employee’s representatives and central management” (Article 2, paragraph 1g) 
between employer’s organisations and trade unions in transnational business operations. 
The directive also highlights the subsidiarity principle, under which member states will be 
able to adapt any provisions made in the directive to the arrangements of their own 
national industrial relations systems, particularly in relation to the selection of employee 
representatives (Preamble, article 20). Part of the new concern for the quality of work and 
the protection of employees in the increasingly borderless labour market of the SEM-27 
are attempts to protect new forms of work. The Commission has thus been more active in 
engaging with member states in preventing the social dumping of workers. It has issued a 
common position with the Council and the European Parliament on a directive on 
temporary agency work. The Commission proposal on this issue is aimed at achieving the 
equal treatment of all agency workers across the EU-27 on the basis of a flexible framework 
which would still allow “differing national practices as regards labour market conditions 
and industrial relations practice” (European Commission 2008d: 7). The Commission has 
also tried to strengthen the application of the directive on the protection of posted 
workers, particularly in the area of services. Here the Commission aspires to find a middle 
way between promoting the spirit of the free movement of services set out in the new 
services directive and the need to protect workers who are posted in service provider 
branches in other member states. The directive does not, therefore, go beyond the 
determination of a core set of minimum standards for posted workers, and puts its 
emphasis on creating “a level playing field as well as a legal certainty” for the free 
competition between service providers in the Single Market (European Commission 
2007b: 3). 
 
Apart from the showing greater concern for the social aspects of the Single Market as part 
of the renewed social agenda, the Commission was forced to take swift action in the area 
of financial services regulation. Here its strong support for a deregulatory laisser-faire 
approach was overtaken by the events of the global credit crunch, which revealed the fatal 
consequences of the application of low levels of regulation in the financial industries in the 
United States. The Commission responded to the crisis by introducing a new agenda of 
what it calls “regulatory repair” (European Commission 2009c: 5).  Based on the 
recommendations put forward in the report issued by the High Level Group of financial 
experts (Larosière group) in October 2008, the Commission has developed proposals for a 
new regulatory framework for financial supervision in the Single Market. The Commission 
accepts that previous arrangements were not suitable to prevent the emergence of the 
financial crisis, but, at the same time, blames “serious failings in the cooperation, 
coordination, consistency and trust between national supervisors”, rather than its own 
deregulatory agenda, as the main reason behind the events that occurred in the financial 
sector (European Commission 2009d: 2). It has consequently proposed a new regulatory 
framework for financial industries in the Single Market, which, although it strengthens the 
level of supranational supervision, mainly concentrates on ensuring the greater efficiency 
of national regulators. The new “macro-micro” financial supervision architecture consists 
of a supranational pillar represented by the European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC) and a 
network of national financial supervisors, the European System of Financial Supervisors 
(ESFS). The strong interaction between these two bodies is supposed to ensure the 
emergence of a “common supervisory culture” (European Commission 2009d: 5). The main 
burden of supervision in this framework falls on the ESFS, which will consist of the 
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Commission and three new supervisory bodies, the European Banking Authority (EBA), the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and a European 
Securities Authority (ESA). While national supervisors will remain in charge of the bulk of 
the supervision of domestic financial industries, the bodies of the ESFS will monitor these 
activities on the basis of a set of common supervisory standards. They will also have the 
right to interfere in case of a disagreement between national supervisory authorities. The 
ESFS authorities have an ultimate right to override national regulators if they the latter fail 
to settle their dispute (European Commission 2009d: 9-10). The main task of the ESRC, 
which will be headed by a president and contain the governors of all national central 
banks as members, is the supervision of the financial services industries on the macro-level 
with regard to their stability and efficient interaction with the global financial system. The 
ESRC will provide an early warning system for national regulators and the ESFS authorities 
of potential risky developments on the basis of reports and collective or individual 
recommendations for particular member states. The Commission does not envisage to 
give the ESRC powers to introduce legally binding recommendations (European 
Commission 2009d: 6:). The emphasis of the new framework rather lies on “binding 
cooperation and information sharing procedures between the ‘micro’ and the ‘macro’ 
levels” (European Commission 2009d: 14), which illustrates the similarity to the rather soft 
approach of the OMC in the social area. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The review of the policy framework, with the new emphasis on a social agenda and the 
rather limited extension of supervisory powers in the financial services sector, marks a 
slight change of emphasis in the overall direction of Single Market, but does not represent 
a radical overhaul of its ideology or its internal dynamics. The Commission neglects the 
promotion of binding standards in the social area, and the parallel deregulatory drive 
towards market liberalisation has lead to a situation where the scepticism about the 
pooling of further powers on the EU regulatory level has grown substantially amongst 
member state governments and citizens. Therefore, the Commission currently has a rather 
limited set of options available which it applies to overhaul the direction of the Single 
Market. The SEM review shows that the Commission now acknowledges that regulation is 
not necessarily always an efficient mechanism to ensure effective market integration:  
 
Regulation remains important in some areas, but it many not always be necessary or 
adequate, for instance where obstacles to the functioning of the single market are not 
primary legal, but mainly behavioural or institutional. (European Commission 2007a: 
12) 
 
Due to the lack of consensus between member states on the elements of a common 
European social agenda, the Commission also seems to be determined to widen the OMC 
approach to further areas, and to deepen its remit by enhancing the input of citizens and 
stakeholders through better information and dialogue with the aim “to help build 
consensus on single market issues” (European Commission 2009b: 4). It remains to be seen 
if this softer, and more inclusive, approach can indeed create a new consensus between 
citizens, national policy-makers and the Commission on the future shape of the Single 
Market, and its role in the global economy. Such a consensus will inevitably depend on the 
establishment of a shared set of values and integrated standards in the social area, which 
prevents the SEM from remaining on the level of a borderless free trade area with an 
increasing diversity of national regulations in the area of employment, welfare, education 
and training. The current economic crisis shows that the Single Market is hardly likely to 
function efficiently on the basis of “race to the bottom” competition for low regulatory 
standards between member states. As national policy-makers and citizens are struggling 
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to come to terms with the knock-on effects of the global economic crisis on their domestic 
economies, they have become more defensive over their national regulatory powers and 
are unlikely to support further intrusion of Single Market legislation in this area. This is 
mainly the result of the fact that the European integration process has made the 
inefficiencies of  domestic employment and welfare systems to fulfil their traditional 
functions of preventing mass unemployment and providing citizens with essential welfare 
provision in the face of globalisation and demographic change more obvious (Esping 
Andersen 1999; Sapir 2004). As a result, national policy-makers and citizens show a 
tendency to, at least partially, blame the EU for the increasing lack of employment and 
welfare security.  
 
The latest Eurobarometer issued in December 2008 shows that citizens across the EU-27 
remain sceptical about the role of the EU in protecting them from the negative effects of 
globalisation (European Commission 2008e). Only 43 per cent consider the EU to fulfil this 
role, while 37 per cent consider it not to be a safeguard against globalisation. Support for 
the greater involvement of the EU level in the process of domestic policy-making in the 
area of social welfare (32 per cent), education (33 per cent) and pensions (26 per cent) also 
remains low. Overall, a slim majority of citizens in the member states support a greater 
input of the EU institutions on national economic policy development (51 per cent). The 
Commission will thus have to make a new positive case for the coordination of national 
standards on the basis of the “best practice”, which will be particularly important for the 
new member states in Central and Eastern Europe, who continue to struggle with the 
tensions between integration into the legal EU acquis of the SEM, the stability and growth 
pact of the Eurozone, and domestic calls for the development of higher standards of 
welfare and education (Goetz 2005: 274). The capacity of national governments to 
maintain welfare systems which offer high levels of protection for citizens are coming 
particularly under pressure from the tendency of Single Market to encourage competition 
for foreign direct investment on the basis of low domestic corporation and capital tax 
rates. In addition, the principle of the free movement of workers, which is at the heart of 
the Single Market, has lead to a certain degree of “welfare shopping” amongst migrant 
workers, which poses an addition burden on already overstretched national welfare 
systems (De Giorgi and Pellizzari 2006; Andersen et al. 2000) 
 
The EU thus needs to move beyond the fixation on growth and jobs in the Lisbon Strategy 
and concentrate on the preservation of core common values in the various economic and 
social models that exist in the SEM-27. The recent global financial crisis showed that the 
deregulation of markets does not automatically lead to increasing wellbeing for citizens. 
On the contrary, the resulting global economic crisis has highlighted the importance of 
regulatory intervention at both the national and the supranational institutional level. The 
ambition to create a level-playing field for competition in the EU-27 Single Market must 
therefore be accompanied by a more efficient coordination of social policies. As Bertola 
points out “the EU can hardly continue to strive for one market and one money as long as 
it features a considerable number of labo(u)r markets, and economic integration will stall if 
it is perceived to conflict with social policy objectives” (Bertola 2006: 27). In this respect, 
the combination of the role of an active state, as a promoter and guarantor of public space, 
manifested in public service quality, employment standards, equality, social cohesion and 
environmental sustainability, with the facilitation of open and dynamic market 
competition, has the potential to be the backbone for a new European success story in the 
global economy of the 21st century.  
 
 
 
*** 
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